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1. Introduction 
 
Local government in France and its relations with the citizens are the central themes 
of this chapter. The system of sub-national government is discussed in section 2. In 
section 3 the focus is on the state tradition that underlies the position of French local 
government. Against this background, in section 4 we elaborate on the tasks of local 
government and inter-governmental relations. In section 5 the political structure of 
local government is delineated. In section 6 we focus on local government-citizens 
relations. First, we give a general characterization of these relations in the context of 
French local government. Since the 1980s there has been a process of decentralisation 
to sub-national authorities. Our case-study, Grenoble, is an example of a city in which 
new ways of  involving citizens in urban policies are being tried out..      
 
 
2. State tradition 
 
In the political organisation of France the so-called ‘Jacobean logic’ plays an 
important role. The Jacobean logic owes its name to the Jacobinists, whose influence  
whittled away the decentralist character of the revolutionary Constituante after the 
French Revolution. The logic is best summarised by the expression ‘L’une et 
indivisible République’, ‘the one and indivisible Republic’ which stands for a 
tendency towards centralisation and uniformity. However, there are competing 
principles of logic in France, such as regionalism and federalism. The system that 
existed before the decentralisation reforms of 1982 has been labelled ‘tamed 
Jacobinism’, because of the balance between the seemingly dominant centralist state 
and the countervailing local forces of the notables locaux. Although the reforms of 
1982 had a strong regionalist element, they were described in terms of Jacobean logic: 
the decentralisation would promote the unity and indivisibility of the Republic 
(Wollmann, 2000; Loughlin and Peters, 1997).  
Even though the French system of government has gone through many major 
changes, the underlying culture has remained the same. This culture entails a broad 
consensus on France being a centralised nation, as laid down in the Constitution’s 
20th Article; the central government decides and directs the nation’s policy. This 
central dominance affects the position of sub-national governments, which are 
considered subordinate to the centre. More in general, it affects the relations between 
the state and society.  
 
The current constitution gives the state all the necessary instruments of government 
leadership and societal control. The French ‘Jacobean’ logic implies, amongst others, 
  
that elected national and subnational governments must carry out ‘the will of the 
people’ directly, without mediation by other interests. The public will overrules the 
pressure of specific interests. Organised interests are, therefore, viewed with suspicion 
(even after 1901, when interest organizations were given the right of establishment 
without prior government authorisation), both by the government and by the 
population. Much more in accordance with the French model are social protest 
movements, which are swiftly organised and as swiftly dissolve. Confrontation is 
considered a legitimate, sometimes even the only, way to be heard. In most cases, the 
government reacts with either appeasement or repression (Schmidt, 2000).  
From this state-society relationship a specific pattern of policy processes emerges. 
The state often formulates policies unilaterally, without first consulting groups that 
may be affected. Schmidt calls this ‘heroic’ policies (Schmidt, 2000: 143). Often, 
society reacts with resisting a policy. In case of resistance, the state usually is ‘weak’ 
in the implementation of the policy, adjusting it or even abandoning it in response to 
the protest. In some sectors, accommodating the public view starts as early as at the 
stage of policy formulation. The extent to which a sector is subject to ‘heroic’ policy-
making depends on its relationship with the state. In general, sectors that have close 
ties with the state (such as business and agriculture) are less often faced with ‘heroic’ 
policies than those that operate at a distance (such as labour).  
More than forty years after the establishment of the Fifth Republic, state and society 
and their relationship with each other have changed. The state is less certain of its 
leadership capacities, although it sometimes still tries to operate ‘heroically’. Society 
is less willing to be led, although it is not sufficiently organised to take the lead itself. 
As Schmidt (2000: 141) concludes, the state has modernised its relations with society, 
but the technocratic nature of the state remains, with a dominant administrative elite 
as well as the periodic re-emergence of the old heroic policy style.  
 
 
3. The system of sub-national government 
 
In the French system, the distinction between sub-national governments and 
administrative districts is relevant (OECD, 1997). Administrative districts 
(circonscriptions administratives) have no legal embodiment or autonomy as opposed 
to sub-national governments. The administrative districts are run by state officials 
who are hierarchically subordinate to the Prime Minister and the ministers in Paris. 
Examples of these administrative districts are arrondissements (of which there are 
337, and which are not to be confused with the sub-municipal arrondissements in the 
three largest cities), cantons (3838 in total, which mainly serve as electoral areas) and 
the Court of Appeal jurisdictions. Sub-national governments (collectivités 
territoriales) have three characteristics in common: (1) a population, (2) territorial 
boundaries and (3) legal bodies empowered to make decisions in the name and 
interest of the population, of which the elected assembly is a notable example 
(Norton, 1994). Three levels of administration in France have these characteristics: 
the municipality (la commune), the department (le département) and the region (la 
région).  
The communes are based on a genuine historic social community (e.g. they 
correspond to a church parish). They were officially established in the days of the 
French Revolution. Nowadays, there are 36,763 municipalities in France, varying 
from small villages with less than a thousand inhabitants (77.1% of all municipalities) 
to large cities like Paris, with more than 2 million inhabitants (European Public 
  
Administration Network, 2000). Differences in population size do not effect the rules 
that apply to the municipality: these are the same for all municipalities. However, 
differences in population size can influence the make-up of institutions. Paris is a 
municipality as well as a department (OECD, 1997). In 1982, another sub-national 
government was created in the three largest cities (Paris, Lyon and Marseille): the 
arrondissements. Legally, these institutions can be established in other cities as well, 
particularly in the case of amalgamations of municipalities with a total population of 
more than 100,000. In Paris and Marseille, the average population of the 
arrondissement is 100,000; in Lyon it is 60,000. 
The départements were created by the State, and are not based on a natural 
community. In 1790, all kinds of intermediate entities, like cities and provinces, were 
abolished and replaced by 83 departments. There are now 100 departments, four of 
which are overseas territories. A department can include one (Paris) to several 
hundred municipalities. To all these departments the same regulations apply. 
The régions have existed longer as administrative districts, but did not become sub-
national governments until 1982. There are 26 regions. Four of them are overseas 
territories; these are both departments and regions and have the customary 
institutions.  The other 22 regions can cover two to eight departments. To all regions 
the same regulations apply. There are some exceptions to the general application of 
regulations. In most cases, this concerns the overseas territories (Départements et 
Territoires d’Outre-mer) (OECD, 1997). 
 
Table 1 shows some institutional characteristics of regions, departments and 
municipalities.  
 
Table 1. Institutions of sub-national authorities 
 
 Region Department Municipality 
Assembly Regional council General council Municipal council 
Term of office assembly 6 years 6 years (half of the 
council up for renewal 
every 3 years) 
6 years 
Electoral system Proportional 
representation, 
departmental lists, 
minimum: 5% of the 
total vote 
Two-round vote for a 
single representative = 
‘cantonal elections’ 
Two-round vote from 
list if pop. < 3,500; 
Adjusted proportional 
representation if  > pop. 
3,500 
Number of members 
assembly 
Minimum: 31 
Maximum: 209 
Minimum: 13 
Maximum: 76 
Paris: 163 
Minimum: 9 
Maximum: 69 
Paris: 163, Lyons: 73, 
Marseilles: 101 
Chief executive Chairman of the 
regional council 
Chairman of the general 
council 
Mayor 
Term of office chief 
executive 
6 years 3 years 6 years 
Representative of the 
State 
Regional prefect Prefect Mayor 
 
Source: OECD, 1997: 169. 
 
Each sub-national government has a representative assembly, which is elected for a 
fixed term (with the exceptions of, amongst others, Corsica and the overseas 
territories). The number of assembly members depends on the size of the population 
in the area and is determined by law. The system of election is also different, for 
  
municipalities with more and those with less than 3,500 inhabitants. In the 
departments and the regions, the chief executive used to be the prefect, a national  
civil servant appointed the by central government, who represented the central 
government. Since 1982, however, the assemblies elect their own executive: the 
chairman of the assembly. The prefects have remained as representatives of the state. 
In the municipalities, the assembly elects the mayor as its chief executive. For certain 
functions, the mayor represents the state as well. In case of malfunctioning, the central 
government has the authority to dissolve assemblies or replace chief executives, but 
such occurances are rare.  
 
 
4. Local government tasks and intergovernmental relations 
 
The French Constitution of 1958 says about sub-national authorities that they 
“administer themselves freely by means of elected councils and under the conditions 
provided by law”. This means that sub-national authorities have the power to decide 
on administrative matters and the management activities needed for implementation. 
Administrative actions are supposed to be a manifestation of the collective will, so 
formally the right to act in any way that fulfils the needs of the society of citizens is a 
general competence (Norton, 1994: 128-130).    
 
As was stated earlier, France has a long history of centralisation and concentration of 
power, stretching from the 16th to the early 19th century. From 1830 until 1981, a 
gradual decentralisation took place. This was characterised by three major changes: 
election of local officials instead of appointment, the transformation of administrative 
districts into sub-national governments with jurisdiction over matters of local concern, 
and a transfer of powers from decentralised state services to sub-national 
governments. The decentralisation trend was accompanied by some deconcentration.  
An important instrument of state control over the sub-national authorities was the so-
called ‘tutelle’ (administrative, technique et financière). The tutelle saw to it that 
decisions had to be legally approved of by the prefect before they could be brought 
into force.  
 
When President Mitterand came to power in May 1981, he initiated important 
decentralisation reforms. An important act in which these reforms were laid down was 
the ‘Law on the Rights and Liberties of Communes, Departments and Regions’ of 2 
March 1982, also known as the Loi Deferre, named after the Minister of the Interior 
who was responsible for it. The reforms had four main basic characteristics: 1) the 
region was transformed into a new sub-national government; 2) some powers were 
transferred from the state to sub-national governments (the principle of clusters, see 
below); 3) in the departments and regions, an elected official became chief executive 
instead of the state-appointed prefect; and 4) state control over sub-national 
governments was reduced, giving greater freedom to sub-national authorities. The a 
priori tutelle was replaced with an ex post facto law review. If a decision is not 
approved of, the matter has to be taken to the administrative tribunal or the regional 
court of audit (cour de comptes). Also, central powers over financial decisions are 
limited, whereas they were extensive before 1982.  The reforms are still in progress, 
and are accompanied by a continuing shift towards deconcentration (OECD, 1997). 
Although the reforms were an important step towards self-government of sub-national 
authorities, the powers and local presence of the State are still challenging this.  
  
 
Wollmann (2000: 43-44) gives three reasons for decentralisation having ‘mixed’ 
results. First, in practice only the big and middle-sized cities have the organisational 
and staff resources needed to fulfil the new role, which makes the gap between large 
and small municipalities, between rural and urban areas, between ‘the France of the 
two speeds’ even wider. Second, this gap places the problem of municipal territorial 
reform high on the agenda (see the next section). To cope with local territorial 
fragmentation, inter-municipal co-operation takes place, which leads to a maze of co-
operative arrangements. Along with other arrangements, such as new metropolitan 
entities, this adds to the so-called ‘over-institutionalisation’ of the politico-
administrative system in France. Finally, the move to deconcentration move that 
should accompany the decentralisation process, has advanced only slowly.  
 
Because France is a unitary state, only parliament has legislative power, raises taxes 
and sets tax rate. The Prime Minister has regulatory power. Regulations are adopted 
by the central government which are called decrees or ministerial orders. In principle, 
these regulations apply to the whole country. Exceptions are possible, e.g. for the 
overseas territories. The prefects of departments and regions and mayors also have 
regulatory power, but their (prefectorial or municipal) orders only apply to their own 
area and are, of course, subject to law. When a mayor exercises his regulatory power, 
he acts as a representative of the state (as he does when he registrers births, deaths and 
marriages). At this level, the functions of state’s representative and elected sub-
national chief executive are still fused. Furthermore, Parliament makes the decisions 
on the organisation of institutions, such as representative assemblies and executives. 
Only the central government has the competence to define its own responsibilities,  
organise itself and determine how to apportion its public powers. Sub-national 
governments do not have such powers, but they can only run their own administrative 
services. In this sense, there is no general competence at the sub-national level. The 
state determines the framework for sub-national policy-making. Local authorities are 
obliged to provide some services (e.g. social benefits and health care); other services 
are non-mandatory. Politicians from sub-national authorities often complain that the 
mandatory services cannot be administered from the state’s financial contribution. In  
case of non-mandatory services, the state can only give incentives, for example, in the 
form of contractual planning (OECD, 1997). 
 
In the ‘Law on Division of Competences between Municipalities, Departments and 
Regions and the State’ of 7 January 1983, the principle is laid down that each 
administrative level has its own responsibilities: the so-called ‘clusters of 
responsibility’. This division is clear in theory, but in practice many responsibilities 
involve several levels, all concerning different aspects. Apart from the fact that the 
central government has not wholly respected the logic of the clusters (e.g. because the 
task is traditionally considered to lie with the national government, even though it 
involves local responsibilities), the concept of the clusters may refer to only a part of 
overall authority. The domain of education is an example of this: the cluster for local 
authorities generally relates to school buildings, while the state cluster covers all other 
aspects.  
With this in mind, sub-national authorities can be said to have the following 
responsibilities: Municipalities are responsible for matters relevant to the immediate 
environment, such as town planning, municipal infrastructure and subsidised housing, 
local public services, health care and social services, education (primary school 
  
buildings and their maintenance), cultural affairs, public safety and aid to employment 
and business (the latter which is subject to compliance with the principle of freedom 
of trade and industry and European Community Law). In larger municipalities, the 
material extent of most of these responsibilities is greater.  
The arrondissements of Paris, Lyon and Marseille have only few rights of action. 
They depend very much on delegation by the municipality. The sub-municipal council 
of the arrondissement can intervene in all matters of interest to its area by writing to 
the mayor or complaining at the municipal council. The council of the arrondissement 
is to be consulted by the municipal council on matters like town planning, homes for 
the elderly, kindergartens, etc. Furthermore, some services relating to the daily life of 
the inhabitants, such as sport, young children and social housing, may be delegated to 
the arrondissements. The sub-municipal mayors have several responsibilities, amongst 
others in elections and town planning, but these are subject to communal regulations; 
the mayors are therefore dependent on the municipal administration. 
Departments also have responsibilities for the management of everyday affairs, such 
as social benefits, health care benefits, placement assistance to the unemployed, 
education (building and maintenance of the collèges, school busses), local transport 
and departmental roads. 
The regions’ responsibilities mainly concern land-use planning and economic 
development: these responsabilities include vocational training, education (building, 
maintenance and operation of lycées), railway and waterway transport and economic 
support measures.  
The state has responsibilities parallel to those of sub-national authorities. The degree 
of responsibility varies across sectors. Education was mentioned earlier as an example 
Another example is public safety. Both the municipalities and the state are responsible 
for this. Regarding the guaranteed income policy,  the state, the departments (prefects 
and chairmen of the council), the municipalities and social security bodies are all  
responsible.  
 
Prefects are important for policy co-ordination. Not only do they co-ordinate the 
deconcentrated state services, but they also divide the  (financial) resources for local 
development. In addition, they represent the state towards sub-national governments 
and handle most contacts between sub-national authorities the and national 
government. Two informal co-ordination mechanisms exist. First, prefects have 
always had close contact with sub-national authorities. Sometimes they have even 
spoken to central ministries or the government on the behalf of sub-national 
authorities. Second, a central feature of the French administrative system is the so-
called cumul des mandats. Elected officials hold a number of different offices, at 
different levels. This binds the levels of government together: the system is built on 
then acceptance of interdependencies between local ‘notables’ (notables locaux), 
politicians at the central level and senior government officials. In this way, the centre 
directs local policies, but local interests direct the policies of the central government 
as well (Norton, 1994).  
Many mayors and members of the general and regional councils are members of 
parliament and sometimes of government itself. In 1985 the cumul des mandats was 
considerably limited by the enforcement of a new law. According to this law, a 
member of parliament (Assembly or Senate) can hold only one other important office, 
such as a European MP-ship, that of regional councillor, general councillor, Paris 
councillor, mayor of a municipality of 20,000 inhabitants or more, or deputy mayor 
(adjoint) of a municipality of more than 100,000 inhabitants.  
  
 
The state has formal means to impose decisions on sub-national governments. 
However, several laws require consultation with sub-national authorities about public 
policy formulation. The general requirement of consultation only exists with respect 
to the overseas areas, this in case the central government proposes not to apply 
national policy to these territories (OECD, 1997).  
According to French law, there is no hierarchy of sub-national levels of government. 
In other words, regions cannot formally impose anything on departments or 
municipalities. Nor can the departments do so on municipalities. There is one 
exception to this rule: the system of business aid, according to which the regions must 
initiate giving a grant before departments and municipalities can supply additional 
grants.  
 
There are few legal requirements of consultation between the different levels. There 
are several legal possibilities of co-operation between sub-national governments. Such 
co-operation is particularly important for the many small municipalities with few 
resources. Co-operation between municipalities can occur for general purposes or in a 
specific domain. All departments have an inter-municipal co-operation committee to 
evaluate and formulate proposals on a strictly advisory basis. Finally, sub-national 
authorities can co-operate at different levels.   
 
 
5. Political structure of local government  
 
As already indicated in the last sectio, there is a large discrepancy between the large 
and the many small municipalities in France. The small municipalities often have 
trouble finding the necessary resources for the provision of services. It is especially 
difficult, if not impossible for these small municipalities to provide non-mandatory 
services (like libraries and tourist offices), but even the mandatory services may only 
be provided through co-operation with other municipalities. Still, attempts to 
amalgamate the smallest municipalities to increase the efficiency of management, 
which was tried in the early 1970s by means of giving financial incentives, have 
largely failed. This underlines the political strength of the notables locaux, as well as 
the great allegiance and sense of identity with which the French relate to and hold on 
to their communes (Wollmann, 2000).  
 
Central to the political life of the municipality is the mayor. He is both the locally 
elected chief executive and the local state representative. In the latter function, he 
ensures the execution of laws and directives from the centre, officially registrers 
births, deaths and marriages and carries responsibility for the collection of certain 
statistical data. In the function of principal executive of the municipality’s wishes, he 
is expected to establish and represent the community’s ‘general view’ in dealings with 
prefects and the central government. The mayor’s status is sometimes compared to  
‘local presidency’. This powerful status is enhanced by the position of the council, 
which generally cannot exercise much control over the mayor’s administrative 
decisions and has to follow his leadership (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).  
 
The principal political division, at national and sub-national level, is that between 
right and left. However, the importance of this division varies per level. At the level 
of small municipalities, party loyalty is often not that important, whereas proved 
  
performance and maintaining traditional support are. Political leaders will draw up  
balanced lists of candidates, wo are well-known and respected people. Furthermore, 
mayors often ignore their partisan role; this is called apolitisme. The mayors’ a-
political attitude has two reasons: first, they consider representing the community as a 
whole more important and, second, when seeking help from the central government, 
they want to avoid being prejudiced by their party loyalties (Norton, 1994).  
In larger cities, political divisions are more important. In some cities, e.g. Grenoble, 
the balance between left and right is evenly weighted, and the elections are therefore  
real contests. In most cities, however, the right or the left is clearly dominant. Parties 
may co-operate when other issues than party loyalty become more relevant. In 
particular, local loyalties may transcend party loyalties in dealings with the central 
government. In order to pressure the centre for more resources, otherwise competing 
parties often unite (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).   
 
The electoral system in France has often been changed since the French Revolution. 
Since then, almost every government has tried to develop a system that ensures 
greater fairness or governmental stability on the one hand and more advantageous 
effects in terms of its own political interest on the other. The present system is a 
compromise between the fairness of proportional representation and the typically 
French two-round elections (Norton, 1994). The French may vote from the age of 18. 
To be elected in municipalities, they have to fall in the same age category.  
With respect to municipalities, a distinction is made between the election system in 
municipalities with less than 3,500 inhabitants and the system in municipalities with 
more than 3,500 inhabitants In the smaller municipalities, parties and/or groups of 
citizens propose a list of candidates, which can subsequently be altered by the voters. 
Candidates the voters disapprove of can be removed from the list and substituted by 
others. This is known as panachage. A two-round election follows. In larger 
municipalities, listed councillors are elected in two rounds by means of proportional 
representation, without panachage. Councillors are chosen for six years. The size of 
the council depends on the size of the population, varying from 9 to 49 members, with 
exception of the largest cities (see Table 1). The arrondissemental councils in Paris, 
Marseille and Lyon have 20, 16 and 9 members respectively. Two-thirds of these 
council members are elected in the same way as in municipalities with more than 
3,500 inhabitants; the remaining one-third consists of city councillors who have been  
elected for that area.   
The mayors as well as their assistants (adjoints), are elected at the first meeting of the 
newly elected council. Normally, these are the council members who headed the 
successful list.  
 
 
6. Local government-citizens relations 
 
In at least one respect citizen participation in France is high. Due to the large number 
of municipalities, there is a substantial number of citizens who participate as elected 
representatives - some half a million, 200,000 of which are mayors or deputy-mayors. 
In a report on local government (Vivre ensemble, 1976), it was argued that abolishing 
municipalities with less than 1,000 inhabitants would mean that some 300,000 
councillors positions would disappear. ”The will to participate would indeed be 
compromised” (Norton, 1994: 143). 
  
Many other citizens are involved in associations and consultative bodies. In some 
municipalities, associations assist in or are primarily responsible for the management 
of certain accomodations, such as cultural and sports centres, or of other provisions 
and facilities, like schools, social aid bureaus or housing bodies. Also, legal 
provisions have been made for associations to play a consultative role in municipal 
planning procedures (Norton, 1994).   
One of the goals of the decentralisation policy of the new socialist government of 
1981 was to stimulate participation. According to Norton (1994) and Negrier (2000), 
however, the expectations have not been met yet. The government of 1993 has 
continued the process of decentralisation and deconcentration. Furthermore, there has 
been some discussion about the introduction of direct democratic procedures. 
According to the Loi Pasqua of 1992, municipalities are allowed to hold consultative 
local referendums. In 1995, the possibility to do this was widened. Since then, the 
local population has had the right to initiate a consultative referendum.  
In the next section, we will describe how in one municipality, Grenoble, the city 
government tries to restructure government-citizens relations.     
 
 
7. Grenoble 
 
Grenoble is situated in the centre of the region Rhones-Alpes, 100 kilometres south-
east of Lyon. The city has about 160,000 inhabitants.  
Grenoble’s history of government–citizens relations bears the stamp of mayor 
Deboudout, who was in office during the 1960s and 1970s. He stimulated the 
involvement of associations in the control of daily affairs in the neighbourhoods and  
the management of facilities. Since then, decentralisation and (re-)centralisation have 
succeeded each other, more or less simultaneously with changes in the political 
signature of the ruling majority. Decentralisation also took the form of 
deconcentration. Between the neighbourhood level and the city level, six districts 
were formed with their own local government offices. In these districts, technical and 
administrative services are managed and provided for. Examples of services that are 
provided are the maintenance of roads and green spaces, the delivery of official 
documents and the provision of information on local matters.   
Since the 1990s a new coalition of left-wing parties has again embarked on a 
decentralisation policy but, in pursuing this policy, the city government faces different 
social conditions than it did in earlier decades. 
 
Problem definition 
Apart from their role as voters, citizens are involved in public affairs through the 
associations. Furthermore, since the 1960s there exists a territorial infrastructure of 
neighbourhood unions (Unions de quartier), which complements the political 
structure at the level of the city. The members of a neighbourhood union (there is one 
union in each of the 23 neighbourhoods) are elected by the associations. They deal 
with questions of welfare and daily affairs in the neighbourhood. They discuss matters 
with local politicians and public officials, formulate proposals etcetera. At the city 
level, there is a liaison committee of all neighbourhood unions (CLUQ: Comite de 
Liaison des Unions de Quartier) to deal with matters of common interest. 
In its assessment of the existing organization of government-citizens relations, the city 
government has judged it to be out of tune with the current conditions of  modern 
urban life. First of all, the associations face an ageing membership. This means that 
  
the associations are losing strength as intermediaries between individual citizens and 
the government. Furthermore, as in most French municipalities, the associations have 
been strongly involved in the management of accomodations, such as sport 
accomodations and cultural centres. However, new generations have different wishes 
and demands; their problems require a broader approach in all the sectors in which  
accomodations and associations are traditionally organised. 
Urban problems not only require a cross-sectoral approach, they often also are of a 
territorial scale that goes beyond the level of neighbourhoods, districts or even the 
city.  The same holds true for the territorial range of the orientation of the inhabitants. 
People are not attached that strongly anymore to a specific neighbourhood. Living, 
working, shopping, recreation and other activities have become territorially more and 
more separated.   
To cope with these new challenges, the city government has to find new ways of 
involving citizens in urban affairs. Also, the city government tries to stimulate the 
associations to adapt to the conditions of modern urban life, for example, to take into 
account the level of the agglomeration.   
 
Initiatives 
 
In 1999 the municipal council decided on several initiatives to restructure 
government-citizens relations in Grenoble.  
In May 1999 it was decided to start an experiment in one of the districts of the city, 
which comprises five neighbourhoods, with a new kind of consultative committee. 
The structure of this committee is designed with the aim of involving age groups and 
social classes that are underrepresented in the associations, namely young, working 
people (aged 20 to 40) and immigrants. In this consultative committee, two sub-
committees function, each with 30 members. There is a sub-committee with 
representatives of the associations, and a sub-committee with individual citizens, 25 
of which are randomly selected from the electoral lists; the other 5 are immigrants 
who have been invited as volunteers and are members in their personal capacity.        
The associations that are represented in the committee are the neighbourhood 
associations (unions de quartier), social-cultural services, joint owners, tenants, 
parents of pupils, entrepreneurs, youth associations and sport associations. An 
important function of the committee is that of providing information, and discussing 
and formulating recommendations on projects that relate to the city as a whole or to 
the agglomeration and that have consequences for the neighbourhoods. The 
committee gathers at least twice a year; an office is provided by the city government 
to guarantee follow-up between two consecutive meetings.  Experience indicates that 
the committee fulfils at least an important information function. Citizens and 
associations express their need for clarification on urban issues and projects.   
In addition to this territorially defined initiative,  two consultative committees at the 
city level have been established to deal with issues and interests that concern specific 
categories of the population. There is one consultative committee of foreign 
inhabitants (non EU-members), and one of elderly people.  
 
A major initiative was the establishment in January 1999 of a consultative committee 
for participative democracy (Conseil de la Democratie participative). In this 
committee, city councillors, aldermen, civil servants and representatives of 
associations meet to define proper ways and methods to involve citizens in the major 
urban projects of the city government. The committee is, so to speak, ‘a platform of  
  
deliberation about deliberation’ (‘concertation sur la concertation’). The associations 
are informed about the major urban projects that are undertaken by the city 
government. For each specific project, the city government and associations discuss 
how citizen participation should be organized, for example, which territorial levels 
should be involved: that of the neighbourhood, district, city or the agglomeration. 
Furthermore, the municipality has to specify whether it aims at providing information 
and/or consultation only, or also at ‘concertation’, the latter which means that there is 
interaction and dialogue about problems and possible solutions.  Examples of projects 
and themes that have been discussed are the ‘Local Contract on Education’, the re-
design of an important square and the prevention of crime.     
The committee has also an important internal function: it has to be a platform where 
public officials working in the territorial context of neighbourhoods and districts as 
well as people working along thematic lines (at the urban level) can meet and attune 
their work. This attunement function also bears on the associations, because the 
committee is a meeting place for both ‘thematic associations’ and neighbourhood 
associations.   
The plenary committee meets twice a year. For complex projects that ask for an 
intense form of ‘concertation’  special working groups can be formed.  
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In the case of Grenoble we see a city government that tries to adapt the infrastructure 
of citizen participation to the conditions of modern urban life. In this process of 
restructuring local government-citizens relations,  the problem and strategies for 
solving it are formulated by the city government. In a sense, the problem definition is 
of a technical-administrative nature, but it is based on an assessment of the changing 
social conditions in Grenoble and the political willingness of the ruling majority to 
provide institutional opportunities for citizen participation. The associations, the main 
partners of the municipality, had to be convinced of the necessity for change. 
Together, and this might be a typical ‘French’ characteristic, the experiments bear the 
stamp of a more or less rational design. At least three design parameters are 
combined: 
- different territorial levels: neigbourhood, district, city and agglomeration 
- territorial versus functional categories 
- deliberation about substantive issues and deliberation about ways and methods of 
deliberation about substantive issues       
 
The experiments in Grenoble are taking place against the background of a 
continuation of the decentralisation policies of the French central government. As we 
noted earlier, according to some authors these policies have not yet led to enhanced 
participation. The case of Grenoble suggests, however, that also within French local 
government there are developments towards a kind of ‘hybrid democracy’, in which 
the representative political democracy is complemented by some direct democratic 
procedures.  Whether Grenoble is an exception, a forerunner or a typical example of 
initiatives in other French cities has yet to be established.  
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